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Introduction
The investigation of deaths occurring in unnatural, surprising and unclear circumstances 
is an important area. Death investigation matters for myriad reasons, including: (legal) 
accountability for risky practices, individuals and institutions; public health and safety; 
systemic institutional concerns and unaddressed risks; medical care quality; to address 
community concerns; and for bereaved individuals’ understanding (Timmermans 2002, 
Freckelton 2007, Hanzlick 2016). If deaths are not effectively investigated and suitable 
remedial action is not taken to respond to findings and recommendation by coroners, 
‘the adverse consequences for the general community [. . .] can be disastrous’ (Freckelton 
2007, p. 1).
Prisoner mortality rates are up to 50% higher than in the wider community 
(UNOHCHR 2019, p. 9) and prisons are ‘uniquely liable to abuses and distortion of 
power’ (Liebling and Crewe 2013, p. 286). Prisoner deaths represent ‘the extreme end of 
a continuum of near deaths and injuries’, creating important learning which could avert 
further deaths,1 ‘risks to custodial health and safety generally’ (Coles and Shaw 2012, 
p. 2), and risks to societies (Link et al. 2019, Auty and Liebling 2020, McLeod et al. 2020). 
(Inter)national law imposes obligations to investigate prisoner deaths. These investiga-
tions deserve further attention in penal scholarship and practice globally. Every prisoner 
death investigation provides a window to identify, organise and apply learning that could 
safeguard prisons and societies. At present, an accountability deficit stretches across the 
criminal justice system and its overseers due to limited efficacy at preventing future 
deaths. There is an international need to develop best practice for investigating deaths in 
detention, which should consider how to stimulate penal change through death 
investigations.
To support the UK’s compliance with Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to life, the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman (PPO) has been investigating prisoner deaths in England and Wales since 
2004 (Owen and Macdonald 2015). Ombud institutions oversee prisons around the 
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world and provide unelected accountability mechanisms, operating at the intersections of 
public administration and administrative law (Behan and Kirkham 2016, Padfield 2018). 
Ombud institutions hold substantive potential to shape imprisonment, but have not 
received commensurate scholarly attention (Carl 2013). Not all Ombud institutions 
investigate deaths. As ‘standard ombudsman territory’ (Seneviratne 2010, p. 21) prisoner 
complaints have generated some limited scholarship (e.g. Sapers and Zinger 2010, 
Calavita and Jenness 2013).
This paper makes an important contribution, examining the Ombudsman’s success at 
establishing feedback loops through prisoner death investigations. We identify potential 
to: i) extend self-conscious, confident communication work, early in the investigation, 
across PPO investigators; ii) communicate praise as well as deficits to prison staff 
throughout investigations; iii) adjust template PPO recommendations. An evidence 
base to inform recommendations is urgently required and holds potential to produce 
a step change in (inter)national prison oversight practices around the world.
Unsafe prisons mean unsafe societies
Prison safety matters and effective ombud institutions could stimulate improved prison 
safety (Tomczak 2021). Prison (un)safety is intrinsically concerning to anyone interested 
in their fellow citizens’ social welfare and human rights (Liebling 2004, Rogan 2018). 
Unsafe prisons have implications far beyond prison walls. Prison (un)safety is instru-
mentally concerning as it suggests future increases in criminal reoffending and risks to 
public health. Poorer prisoner health and poorer quality of prison life both correlate with 
higher reoffending rates (Link et al. 2019, Auty and Liebling 2020). Moreover, prison 
health is public health (McLeod et al. 2020). Rates of disease, drug dependency and 
mental illness in prison populations are much higher than in general populations 
(UNOHCHR 2019, p. 9). Globally, around 30 million people are released from custody 
each year, so prisons are a vector for (community) transmission of infectious diseases, 
disproportionately impacting marginalised communities (Kinner et al. 2020). Mass 
imprisonment is a social problem, producing cumulative, intergenerational social 
inequality (Simon 2012). Prison safety, prisoner health and imprisonment rates matter, 
morally and for protecting the health and safety of prisoners, staff and societies. Prison 
health and safety cannot be the sole preserve of reformists: real people are already caught 
up in detention, so it cannot be overlooked by those prioritising an anti-carceral agenda 
(Carlton 2018). Addressing prison health and safety is now more urgent than ever before. 
Almost 11 million people are imprisoned globally, of whom 30% have not been convicted 
of a crime (Penal Reform International 2019). Amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic, 
these people are unable to leave environments that concentrate ‘poverty, conflict, dis-
crimination and disinterest’ (World Health Organization 2000, p. 11).
In an adjacent area of inquiry, Serious Case Reviews in England were established 
under the Children Act 2004 to review cases where a child has died and abuse or neglect 
is known or suspected. Serious Case Reviews have been conceptualised as the tip of an 
iceberg: overall numbers of children dying through maltreatment are small, but many 
more suffer lower levels of abuse or neglect. In turn, every Serious Case Review provides 
a window ‘allowing us to identify lessons to be learnt for safeguarding and promoting the 
welfare of children’ (Brandon et al. 2012, pp. 1–2). Similarly, prisoner deaths represent the 
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tip of an iceberg of prisoner ill health, neglect, poor quality of prison life and abuse, which 
are all morally problematic and correlate with increased reoffending and public health 
risks. (Inter)national law imposes obligations to investigate prisoner deaths 
(International Committee of the Red Cross/ICRC 2013, Rogan 2018). Prisoner death 
investigations create rich data which have been little utilised by academia, policy or 
practice (Tomczak 2018, 2021), but offer ‘a starting point for much-needed analysis’ into 
the quality of prison life, prison regimes (Liebling and Ludlow 2016, p. 238), prisoner (ill- 
)health and risks to societal health and safety. It is recognised that these investigations 
serve important functions in terms of providing an effective remedy for the next of kin, 
and holding those responsible accountable (ICRC 2013). Ryan (2019) argues that health-
care inquests and inquiries should seek to trigger demonstrable change, to reassure 
bereaved families that changes will be implemented as an outcome of their loved one’s 
death. Every prisoner death investigation provides a window to identify, organise and 
apply learning that could not only reassure bereaved families, but safeguard and enhance 
safety in prisons and societies. Death investigations are potentially significant triggers for 
harm reduction, although we now demonstrate that this potential is yet unrealised.
Current prison conditions in England and Wales pose risks to the health and well- 
being of prisoners, staff, prisoners’ families (Ismail 2020) and societies (Tomczak 2021). 
Prison safety dramatically deteriorated from 2012, with increased levels of suicide, 
violence, self-harm, radicalisation and gang formation (Ismail 2019, Prison Reform 
Trust/PRT 2019). Between 2012 and 2016, suicide rates more than doubled (Ministry 
of Justice/MoJ 2017), ‘after a period of change for the prison workforce as a result of 
making efficiencies’ (MoJ 2016, p. 41). Benchmarking policy generated the largest staff 
reductions in the service’s history (Peacock et al. 2018). 2016’s record prison suicide 
numbers drained hundreds of millions of pounds from public funds and harmed prison-
ers, prison staff and those bereaved (Tomczak 2018). Self-inflicted death rates remain 
elevated above pre-benchmarking rates (MoJ 2020, p. 2). Fiscal austerity has exacerbated 
the existing poor health of prisoners, impeding access to healthcare and productive 
activities (Ismail 2019). Statistics indicate i) declining prisoner health, which is crucial 
for behaviour change and has important implications for re-entry outcomes, reincarcera-
tion (Link et al. 2019) and public health (McLeod et al. 2020), and ii) declining prison 
safety and legitimate order, which is a precondition for prisoner growth and change 
(Auty and Liebling 2020). Criminal reoffending already costs £18.1 billion annually in 
England and Wales (Newton et al. 2019).
Prisoner death investigations
Deaths in coercive institutions involve legal obligations and legal responses (Rogan 2018) 
and threaten the fundamental human right to life, which forms the basic pre-condition of 
the enjoyment of other rights (Owen and Macdonald 2015). (Inter)national human rights 
law and humanitarian law impose obligations to respect and protect life in all circum-
stances, and to investigate suspected violations of the right to life (ICRC 2013). 
Nevertheless, in many prisons globally deaths are frequent, sometimes preventable and 
mostly considered ‘natural’ (Tomczak 2018). Prisoner death investigations remain ripe 
for development. Following an international survey, the Correctional Service Canada 
(CSC) Review on Non-natural Deaths in Custody (CSC 2018, pp. 58–9, emphasis added) 
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concluded: ‘there is a need to develop best practice’ for investigating deaths in custody, 
rather than adopting best practice from other countries. We add that such best practice 
should consider how to identify, organise and apply learning from death investigations, 
in order to effect penal change through death investigations and in turn safeguard prisons 
and societies.
Applicable legal frameworks, and the agencies and techniques used to investigate 
deaths vary widely between countries and detention institutions. Legal frameworks 
include soft international law e.g. the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners/Mandela Rules: specifically Rules 71.1 (on investigating the 
circumstances and causes of deaths) and 71.2 (on dealing with the body), and interna-
tional jurisprudence e.g. the ECHR. The ICRC sets out state obligations under interna-
tional law and summarises guidelines for investigations in Annexe II (ICRC 2013).
In the Council of Europe’s 46 member states, all deaths in compulsory state detention 
that are unexplained or related to violence and self-harm automatically engage Article 2 
of the ECHR, which protects the right to life. Article 2 includes a procedural obligation, 
and duty to investigate potential violations of the i) positive obligation: to protect the life 
of a person involuntarily in state custody and ii) negative obligation: to prohibit inten-
tional and unlawful taking of life by state agents. The form and nature of an Article 2 
investigation varies across jurisdictions but must meet multiple criteria. The investigating 
authorities must act of their own motion. The investigation must be initiated promptly 
and proceed with reasonable expedition; be independent; be open to public scrutiny; 
involve the next of kin to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests; and 
be effective. Effective means that the investigation must: be conducted in a manner that 
does not undermine its ability to establish the relevant facts; comprise or obtain sufficient 
expertise; secure the relevant evidence, including witness evidence; identify those respon-
sible for the death; reach conclusions in the central issues that are tenable and convincing 
and identify any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system; and ensure 
accountability of state agents and bodies (Owen and Macdonald 2015). These parameters 
are valuable and important, but primarily backwards facing. Whilst this legislative basis 
underpinning the crucial tasks of identifying, organising and applying learning from 
prisoner deaths is weak, the House of Lords in Amin [R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex p Amin [2003] UKHL 51] identifies the purpose of investigation under 
Article 2 thus (in Richards 2007, p. 3, emphasis added):
to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light, that culpable and 
discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice, that suspicion of deliberate 
wrongdoing if unjustified is allayed, that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified, 
and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that 
lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others.
The PPO has no statutory footing and operates using memoranda of understanding. 
Despite the primarily backwards-facing legislative basis for their investigations, the PPO 
assists the Coroner’s inquest to fulfil the investigative obligation arising under Article 2 
‘by working together with coroners to ensure as far as possible that the full facts are 
brought to light and any relevant failing is exposed, any commendable action or practice 
is identified, and any lessons from the death are made clear’ and to ‘examine whether any 
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change in operational methods, policy, practice or management arrangements would 
help prevent a recurrence’ (PPO 2017, p. 92).
In the UK, a Coroner must investigate all deaths in compulsory state detention under 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 section 1(2)(c). Where the Coroner’s inquest illus-
trates a concern that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur or continue 
to exist in the future, the Coroner is obliged to send a Report to Prevent Future Deaths/ 
PFD report to organisations or persons with the power to take preventative action, even if 
the Coroner’s concern is peripheral to the death. PPO investigations have barely been 
researched by scholars. By its own analysis, the PPO struggles to effect change:
In 2018/19 we began 334 fatal incident investigations. [. . .] We saw a 23% increase in self- 
inflicted deaths this year with worryingly high numbers in some prisons. In many cases, we 
had to make the same recommendations as in previous years, where remedial action had been 
promised (PPO 2019, p. 11, emphasis added).
Related analyses of Coroners’ inquests into custodial deaths highlight an accountability 
deficit across the criminal justice system and its overseers, because Coroner’s interpreta-
tion of their power to make PFD reports is inconsistent across locales, nobody is 
responsible for judging whether responses to PFD reports are appropriate and effective, 
and there is no consistent mechanism for assessing implementation. Limitations are 
exacerbated by PFD reports being perceived as punishment rather than a learning 
opportunity, and a lack of clarity about who should engage stakeholders to create 
improvements (Coles and Shaw 2012, Mendas 2012).
It is particularly concerning that death investigations’ harm reduction potential is 
unrealised because England and Wales’ range of prison oversight bodies form compara-
tors for elsewhere (van Zyl Smit 2010, Tomczak 2021). Yet, the UK’s ‘blueprint’ oversight 
apparatuses have neither challenged high imprisonment rates (with Scotland, then 
England and Wales leading Western Europe (PRT 2019, p. 56)), nor addressed recent 
dramatic declines in prison safety. The UK claims world-renowned detention monitoring 
methodologies and approaches, which its Foreign and Commonwealth Office actively 
promotes overseas. The UK actively participated in drafting and was amongst the first to 
ratify the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT), which is now being 
exported around the world (NPM 2016).
Theoretical underpinnings
Prison regulation is an enduring, essential ‘counterweight to potential abuse of the special 
powers of the state’ (Hood et al. 1999, p. 116), made only more urgent by neoliberal 
carceral expansionism in many jurisdictions, the globally expanding prison population 
and the COVID-19 pandemic (Tomczak 2021). Regulation is concerned with improving 
performance by steering the flow of events and behaviour (Braithwaite et al. 2007a), and 
holding key personnel responsible for it. Regulation encompasses sanctioning and 
supporting activities, most frequently involving education and persuasion but potentially 
escalating to litigation and prizes (Braithwaite et al. 2007b). Regulation can have trans-
formative, emancipatory effects on individual people, public services and institutions 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007b, Smith 2009), as such: ‘regulation matters, and therefore the 
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development and empirical testing of theories about regulation also matter’ (Braithwaite 
et al. 2007a, p. 4).
Regulation is essentially prospective (forward facing) but complements and overlaps 
with accountability processes which are essentially retrospective (backwards facing) 
(Black 2001). Regulation and accountability share common rationales of improving 
performance and holding actors responsible, and both seek to steer behaviour: establish-
ing, monitoring and enforcing performance standards through rewards, awards and 
sanctions (Smith 2009). Prison oversight bodies differentially prioritise regulation and 
accountability. The PPO’s work on death investigations and complaints most closely 
resembles accountability, but OPCAT is principally preventative and most closely 
resembles regulation. It is often unclear where regulation ends and accountability begins 
(Black 2001), but fair and effective social processes require them both (Smith 2009). 
Sapers and Zinger (2010, p. 1515) illustrate this, regarding the Canadian Office of the 
Correctional Investigator’s (Federal Prison Ombudsman) dual roles: providing redress 
for individual grievances (accountability) and stimulating the systemic improvement of 
standards (regulation):
Through investigating individual cases, ombudsmen may highlight weaknesses [. . .]. 
Discovering these weaknesses is of advantage [. . .] because the resulting improvements in 
the system provide a generalized benefit. These two roles do not conflict, nor should they be 
separated. Any office that [. . .] investigates complaints is only doing half its job if its 
casework experience is not used to provide comprehensive feedback. [. . .] Such feedback 
could [. . .] lead to improvements when investigations reveal systemic problems or failures.
Pursuing individualised accountability for past failures and abuses for its own sake is 
a partial strategy that will not enable ombud institutions to fulfil their potential as agents 
of harm reduction, and also means that prevention efforts will not be adequately 
informed by the lessons of the past. As such, it is notable that the PPO in England and 
Wales do not sit on the UK’s OPCAT National Preventative Mechanism.3
Similar debates are also present in the broader scholarship on ombud institutions. 
Ombud institutions that focus on casework and investigating individual injustices miss 
opportunities to bring about good administration by acting as a ‘system fixer’ and 
‘learning agent’, potentially by mobilising or establishing ‘own-initiative’ powers of 
investigation (Gill 2020). This is particularly important because the ability to perceive 
and name problems is structurally patterned (Calavita and Jenness 2013) and those with 
fewer resources and/or in vulnerable social locations are predisposed to self-blame and 
disentitlement (Michelson 2007). As such, it is not sufficient for ombud institutions to 
solely act responsively and pursue backwards-facing accountability efforts (Gill 2020).
Analytical approach: cybernetics
Applied to government and societies by Deutsch (1966), cybernetics is a generalised 
theory of governance which examines how order is created and maintained. The cyber-
netic paradigm valuably integrates existing governance models by exploring how diverse 
subsystems function simultaneously to create self-correcting institutions (Birnbaum 
1989). Every ordered structure will in some form seek to control its environment, 
requiring it to perform actions through which it attempts to affect its environment to 
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fulfil its purposes, monitor whether these actions had the intended effects and, if not, 
adjust its actions accordingly (Gadinger and Peters 2016). Cybernetics examines ways in 
which a system’s output affects input into that system, and thus subsequent output. To 
claim control, a system must demonstrate cybernetic validity, i.e. having a feedback loop 
in which some output triggers a system change, being used as input for future operations 
(Green and Welsh 1988). Examining organisational control systems in terms of sensing 
mechanisms and feedback loops highlights institutional thermostats which monitor 
changes from acceptable levels of functioning and activate forces that return institutions 
to their previous stable state (Birnbaum 1989).
In our case, the PPO seeks to effect change in prisons to ensure that the circumstances 
of prison deaths are brought to light, any relevant failing is exposed, examine whether 
any changes in operational methods, policy, practice or management arrangements 
would help prevent recurrence and ‘ensure as far as possible that [. . .] lessons from the 
death are made clear’ (PPO 2017, p. 9). Following Gadinger and Peters’ conceptualisation 
of feedback loops in foreign policy (2016), our analysis examines: i) how the PPO seeks to 
effect change in prisons following a prisoner death, ii) whether these actions had the 
intended effects and iii) if and how the PPO adjusts its actions.
Our approach is innovative, as cybernetics have been little used in criminal justice 
scholarship and/or practice. Our approach is valuable because analysing feedback (in) 
effects can transcend (sub)disciplinary boundaries, by combining analysis of structure 
and agency, over time, in a single framework (Gadinger and Peters 2016). Structuralist 
theories (e.g. Foucauldian analyses) tend to be static and obfuscate potential for agency 
and change. Cybernetics provides a non-deterministic perspective that links action (in 
our case, of the PPO) with the structures in which it is embedded (England and Wales’ 
Prison Service), by which it is affected and affects itself. Neither agency nor structure is 
considered determinate, because no actor can fully control its environment and, by 
acknowledging fundamental elements of chance in the texture of the universe, cyber-
netics can acknowledge creativity and novelty in social relations (Deutsch 1966). 
Feedback happens over time, so forces analysts to think across longer intervals, which 
become easily obscured both in other types of scholarship and busy organisations. 
Feedback analysis can make long-term processes that (fail to) produce change visible. As 
feedback loops can amplify effects, cybernetics holds that ‘small causes can have large 
consequences’ (Gadinger and Peters 2016, p. 256). This approach is beneficial for this 
case, given i) the prevailing dystopias in criminological scholarship and tendency to 
produce teleological depictions of ever-proliferating governmentality which obfuscate 
any possibility for remoralising carceral regimes and deconstructing the carceral state 
(Carlen 2001, Zedner 2002, Bosworth 2011); and ii) the urgent need to reduce penal and 
concurrent social harms (Tomczak 2021).
Materials and methods
To investigate the extent to which the PPO meets its potential to improve safety in 
prisons and societies, a large research project was undertaken with multisectoral stake-
holders. This article reports on one of the initial phases, which entailed 16 semi- 
structured interviews with Ombudsman staff, spanning Senior Investigator to Senior 
Management roles. Volunteer participants were recruited using a purposive sample. 
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Interviews were carried out by Philippa Tomczak and research assistant Sara Hyde in 
December 2019, and were audio recorded with participants’ consent. Ethical approval 
was granted by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service and the University of 
Nottingham.
This research resulted from the academic (Philippa Tomczak) and the Ombudsman 
(Sue McAllister) meeting in January 2019 at a Prison Reform Trust Prisoner Policy 
Network event. Tomczak had researched prisoner death investigations in England and 
Wales (Tomczak 2018) and remained concerned about death rates. McAllister was newly 
in post and seeking to increase the impact of Ombudsman investigations. Our partner-
ship (Tomczak/McAllister) was initially funded by a University of Nottingham impact 
prize and ESRC impact accelerator grant, administered by Tomczak.
All interview transcripts were thematically coded and analysed in Word, using ethno-
graphic content analysis (ECA) to answer the three research questions. Unlike positivist 
document analysis, ECA conceptualises document analysis as fieldwork. ECA entails 
discovery of analytical themes and sustained reflexivity about the research process and 
document production processes. Reflexive and recursive movement between concept 
development–sampling–data collection–data coding–data analysis – interpretation pro-
vides a systematic approach, whilst retaining flexibility to (re)develop analytical cate-
gories (Altheide and Schneider 2013). This flexibility can enable novel findings and step- 
changes in analysis, facilitating important implications for practice.
Results
Results are now presented in four sections. The first provides context regarding PPO 
investigations to underpin the three following sections, which examine: i) how the PPO 
seeks to effect change in prisons following a prisoner death, ii) whether these actions had 
the intended effects and iii) if and how the PPO adjusts its actions.
Fatal incident investigations: context
The PPO investigate every prisoner death and produce good quality reports. 
BEVERLEY: We meet the requirements of Article 2 [. . .] for every death in state 
detention to be subject to an independent investigation and we agreed back in 2004 
that we would take on that, [. . .] to produce a report of an independent investigation. 
[. . .] We do quality investigations and we do produce good reports.
Each investigation seeks to establish ‘what happened’ by collating diverse forms of 
evidence. 
JULES: You are trying to find out what happened to the person when they were in 
custody. [. . .] So the first thing [. . .] is [. . .] email the prison Liaison Officer and it’s 
a long list of documents that you want. Also in a self-inflicted death, you always do 
an opening visit. [. . .] That’s when you generally collect the paperwork, [. . .] you 
can pump various people for information. [. . .] That’s a golden opportunity to try 
and talk to the prisoners. [. . .] A lot of the self-inflicted deaths [. . .] are in local 
prisons, so you can’t tell whether that population is going to be there a few weeks 
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later. [. . .] Once you have captured as much as you can from that you [. . .] read all 
the documents and start getting an interview list.
AVERY: In terms of finding out what happened, we get all the evidence that we can [. . .], 
so [. . .] paper evidence, [. . .] CCTV, [. . .] ambulance records, all the [. . .] stuff that is 
available. We also go and interview. [. . .] In natural causes cases, it’s less common and it 
may be that we need to interview 1 or 2 people and we can [. . .] by video link [. . .]. In 
more complex investigations, including self-inflicted deaths, we will nearly always go to 
the prison and interview staff and prisoners and medical staff.
These investigations therefore draw on a wide range of data sources, facilitating 
triangulation and strongly positioning the investigation to establish ‘the full circum-
stances of prison deaths’ (PPO 2017, p. 9) and inform the Coroner thereof. The inves-
tigation may also be guided by family input, adding both a further source of information 
and the potential to assuage family concerns: 
AVERY: A Family Liaison Officer, they always make contact at the very beginning with 
[. . .] the bereaved family, to ask if there’s any questions they want looked at.
All of the available evidence is then compared to local and national prison policy: 
ZARA: We try and establish what happened [. . .] we will check to see what records there 
are, that relate to that incident [. . .]. We will get a range of information, [. . .] so that we 
can establish what really happened [. . .]. So a lot of exploratory, in terms of us then 
reaching out to the prison saying ‘right, you tell us what you know about this, show us the 
audit trail, you provide us with the evidence’. [. . .] Then we pull it all together, refer to 
policies to say: ‘did this happen [. . .] how it should happen?’
VICKY: Prison Service Instructions, we rely on quite a lot when we are writing reports 
and obviously local policy. Sometimes it’s about going back to the prisons and saying 
[. . .] ‘show me what your policy is and then I can see whether that was right’.
However, PPO staff were not constrained by these policies. Indeed, Beverley described 
two instances where the PPO’s work had stimulated changes in national policy regarding 
prison operations. As such, there appears to be scope to pursue further systemic changes 
where required. 
BEVERLEY: The restraints is a good example of our work [. . .] some fairly high-profile 
cases resulted in a change to the policy where healthcare considerations have to be given 
due weight [. . .]. Another example is about emergency response. So if you are a Prison 
Officer working on a landing and you go to a cell and you look through the hatch and you 
see somebody hanging, the policy, influenced in some part by our findings, is that subject 
to a dynamic risk assessment, if you think there is a threat to life and you assess that it is 
safe to do so you can go into the cell immediately.
Preventing prisoner deaths was expressed as an investigation aim by all 16 
participants. 
INTERVIEWER: investigations, what are the goals, what are they trying to achieve?
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SIDNEY: Overall to make prisons safer and to stop prisoners committing suicide, or 
killing each other, or dying from drugs essentially.
HARPER: Our goal is to try and make things better, to try and make changes or to try and 
encourage the Prison Service to make changes, so [.] someone else in that same situation 
might not, and to try and [. . .] protect people.
PPO staff were therefore clearly not just investigating the circumstances of deaths but 
aiming to apply that knowledge to prevent further deaths. In order to protect prisoners 
and prevent deaths, Harper strived to produce their best investigation, identifying which 
problems happened, and where: 
HARPER: By doing as good as an investigation as you can, by working out what the 
problems are and where those, the sort of fatal flaws have happened.
Investigators were gathering extensive information and working hard to complete 
their investigations. Resultant findings are then fed back to prison staff at different points 
in time, but the main means through which the PPO seeks to control prisons is through 
recommendations, which are produced from the findings of their investigations.
i) How does the PPO seek to effect change in prisons following a prisoner death?
BEVERLEY: We find where things have gone wrong or not been done properly and we 
make recommendations as to what needs to be done to put those things right, to 
prevent recurrences in the future [. . .] We investigate what happened, we look at what 
happened, we look at what went wrong and we make recommendations to put those 
things right.
Staff discussed feeding back their findings to prison staff during the investigation’s 
early stages, although this appeared to be inconsistent across investigators, dependent on 
individual initiative. For Finley, early feedback was rare, reserved for substantive issues 
requiring immediate attention. 
FINLEY: If something particularly big comes out, i.e. where we feel that something needs 
to change straightaway, then we would inform the Governor4 or Director5 as soon as we 
can. That’s relatively exceptional, I mean you would normally go in and [. . .] tell them 
a bit about the issues you have been looking at [. . .] but mostly it comes down to what is in 
the report which [. . .] comes out about six months or so after the death, give or take. The 
report [. . .] I guess the key parts there are the findings, where we have identified what the 
key issues are that we have addressed in the investigation, [. . .] whether we think there is 
anything that could have been better and make a recommendation for the Prison Service 
to act on (emphasis added).
Finley also identified that his interpersonal skills were less strong than his written 
work, but he was evaluated only on the latter. 
FINLEY: Our managers essentially judge us on the quality of our written work. [. . .] 
There’s no appreciation of whether you are good in the field or not. [. . .] I think my 
written work is probably better than my fieldwork. I wouldn’t say I’m terrible, [. . .] but 
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I think I’m probably not the most confident person in dealing with people, particularly 
senior figures in the Prison Service. [.] We are always out there on our own with no real 
support, with no management oversight really.
For Ella, feeding back to staff at all levels during the early investigation was core 
practice that could address problems quickly. Ella identified this practice to be ‘as 
important if not more important’ than the report, and appeared confident approaching 
senior Governors. 
ELLA: You have got six months to produce your investigation report, it will be daft not to 
flag something, [. . .] be foolish to leave that six months. So I would just go in and have 
a conversation with the Governor or Director and say ‘look your staff don’t understand 
what the medical emergency process is, you need to do something about that’. [. . .] It’s that 
low level stuff which I think is as important if not more important. In my opinion when 
you are interviewing staff and they don’t know [. . .] and you just say ‘look, do you know 
this is what you are meant to do?’ [. . .] For me, that person is very likely to go back to their 
colleagues and say [. . .] ‘I didn’t know this, did you?’ [. . .] You can effect some positive 
change that way quite quickly, [. . .] on a low level but I think quite important level.
Harper highlighted that they consciously sought to build rapport and used clear 
communication as a strategy to increase the impact of their verbal and written findings. 
HARPER: During the investigation [. . .] make it clear to prison staff, Governors [. . .], so 
that they [. . .] know what the issues are and then [. . .] write it in such a way [. . .] that it’s 
clear, it’s understandable, so that they can recognise that they need to make changes. [. . .] 
Getting them on side means that they will actually want to make changes [. . .]. It can be 
very hard but that’s the way to do it, I think.
Ella and Harper displayed self-conscious, confident communication work, early in the 
investigation, which there is potential to extend across PPO investigators. However, 
participants overwhelmingly discussed communicating with prison staff about deficits. 
Nursing home regulation research has emphasised that inspectors’ praise
engendered the collective pride that is the stuff of high workplace morale and high 
performance. [. . .] Inspection teams who used praise a lot as a regulatory strategy improved 
compliance in the two years following an inspection significantly more than inspection 
teams that did not (Braithwaite et al. 2007b, pp. 116–117).
Praise improved compliance regardless of how deserving of praise the nursing homes 
were. When collectives are praised, all members want to share in the credit, and when 
individual members of a collective are praised, the collective claims a share of the praise. 
In contrast, when collectives are blamed or punished, ‘each involved individual tends to 
believe it is someone other than them who is responsible; when individuals are blamed, 
the collective tends to disown or distance itself from the individual’ (Braithwaite et al. 
2007b, pp. 116–117). Given that informal praise is a more powerful form of social control 
than blaming, there is considerable scope for the PPO to communicate praise as well as 
deficits in order to better influence practice in prisons.
ii) Do PPO actions have the intended effects on prisons?
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All participants attached importance to their work: including addressing power imbal-
ances, making contributions to bereaved families, humanising deceased prisoners, sup-
porting Coroners’ inquests and supporting human rights litigation. 
ZARA: I feel like I am righting any wrongs and [. . .] standing up for the little person [. . .] 
against an organisation as large as the Prison Service, [. . .] so there’s a sense of justice 
there and fairness.
AVERY: The families, [. . .] some of them really do appreciate that we have cast light on 
what actually happened and that we have acknowledged that the person who died was 
[. . .] a human being and that their death was worthy of investigation. [. . .] Coroners find 
our investigation reports very useful. [. . .] Human rights law firms that take these cases 
up, they love our reports because we have done all the work for them, then they can just 
use them to request compensation or whatever is appropriate.
JULES: You feel like you are doing a worthy job, the differences you can see you make 
[. . .] I have spoken to several next of kin [. . .] the fact that I have taken the time to speak 
to them and answered their questions and responded promptly and been sincere etc., has 
made a big difference.
However, there was simultaneously a strong sense that these contributions were 
inadequate and PPO investigations did not achieve enough overall. 
RILEY: You have the [. . .] small sense of achievement, which is to provide the family with 
the details of what happened before the death, uncovering problems, uncovering [. . .] 
missed opportunities, pointing those out to the Service. But [. . .] it can sometimes feel 
[. . .] like we are not really achieving [. . .] change and that’s obviously why we all do this 
because we want things to change. [. . .] I mean there are always going to be some deaths 
you can’t prevent [. . .] but [. . .] how many years ago did we do 10 deaths at Woodhill? If 
we had really achieved something, should we be in a position where there aren’t any 
deaths at Woodhill? Or if there was a death it [. . .] totally comes out of the blue and no 
one could possibly have predicted it. So it can sometimes feel [. . .] that [. . .] we are 
missing the mark, [. . .] it can be quite depressing.
BEVERLEY: I’ve been really exercised [.] by the question of is that enough, about could we, 
[. . .] should we be doing more to influence what actually happens in prisons and to reduce 
the number of people who take their own lives and to make prisons fairer and safer?
SIDNEY: We really look into that death and see if there were any failings and if there 
were, find out why [. . .] and feed that back to the Governor and obviously write a report 
and make recommendations to the relevant people. [. . .] The problem comes when they 
don’t, [. . .] they have to provide an action plan but it is whether they ever do anything to 
stop that happening again, that’s the bit that frustrates me.
Seeing repeated failings, sometimes within the same prison, was an indication that the 
window of opportunity to identify, organise and apply learning that could safeguard 
prisons and societies was being squandered. Moreover, seeing repeated failings could be 
undesirable and difficult for PPO staff, even feeling soul-destroying. 
INTERVIEWER: in a best case scenario, what would the work of the PPO achieve?
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AVERY: That these same things wouldn’t keep happening.
HARPER: Some prisons [. . .] it almost seems that [. . .] we could just copy and paste 
a previous report, change the names and the same things would apply. [. . .] just nothing 
changes, that they just pay, almost pay us, our reports and recommendations, almost lip 
service. [. . .] It can be fairly soul-destroying [. . .] when you have made recommendations 
and the prisons are pushing back or you hear that the same situation has happened and 
they are just not learning, so you can be quite despondent. [. . .] I’m almost saying I’m not 
sure it achieves a massive amount in some of the bigger prisons because we do keep 
saying the same things again and again and again.
Despite the primarily backwards-facing legislative basis for their investigations, PPO 
staff are invested in preventing prisoner deaths. Yet, consistently repeated recommenda-
tions indicate that PPO investigations do not reduce prisons’ vulnerability to preventing 
future deaths and potentially establish a vicious cycle by demoralising PPO staff, which 
has implications for their wellbeing, productivity (Kalra et al. 2016), and motivation to 
invest in long-term, strategic thinking and/or attempts to adapt practice.
iii) How does the PPO adjust its actions?
As the interviews made clear, PPO staff sought to reduce prisoner deaths and could be 
greatly affected by repeated failings and continuing deaths, sometimes over long careers 
at the organisation. However, attempts to change PPO practice in response to this lack of 
impact appeared limited. 
INTERVIEWER: How long have you worked at the Ombudsman?
SIDNEY: Nearly 10 years. A long time!
INTERVIEWER: Lots of people have been here a long time.
SIDNEY: Yeah I think particularly in the self-inflicted team actually. [. . .] It’s the same 
things happening now that happened 10 years ago [. . .] that’s the part of my job that 
I really hate the most because it just feels like nothing is changing. [. . .] It’s the same 
recommendations and the same seriousness, [. . .] the cases are just awful, the risk 
assessments going on, the ones I’ve seen recently are probably worse than, you know. 
[. . .] Falsifying records, [. . .] it’s all going on. [. . .] I know HMIP (Inspectorate of Prisons) 
will follow up on our recommendations but [. . .] nothing really happens.
A recommendations database was apparently established between five and 10 years 
ago due to a drive for consistency. However, the interviews indicated that template 
recommendations on the database had received minimal attention, which represents 
a key area for development. 
FINLEY: We have a recommendations database, which I use quite a bit, [. . .] to ensure 
you are being consistent with previous recommendations. [. . .] It’s been around [. . .] 
about 6 or 7 years, [. . .] I think the earliest cases [.] are about 2010/11, [. . .] probably 
someone just decided it was a good idea one day and let the team carry on.
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Some efforts to strengthen PPO influence were described, but these were difficult and 
had apparently made little difference. 
SIDNEY: Sometimes (prisons) [. . .] come up with an action plan and we do challenge 
them, if it’s basically saying: ‘we accept them all but actually we are doing all this already’. 
[.] If an Investigator is really busy, they [. . .] haven’t got time to keep arguing with the 
prison about actually, ‘that was already in place and it still wasn’t working’, so it’s 
difficult. We do escalate cases [. . .] when coming back to the same prison and I’m not 
afraid to do that, but similarly I’m not sure that has any more sort of weight, [. . .] that will 
just depend on [. . .] whoever the Group Director is.
When considering continuing deaths, repeated failings and repeated recommenda-
tions, PPO participants tended to point to largely intractable factors beyond their control 
as explanations. 
SIDNEY: We are not resourced to go back and say: ‘show me this, show me that, what 
have you actually done?’ So there isn’t really any comeback.
BEVERLEY: Key [. . .] for our recommendations not [. . .] delivering change is that we 
have no teeth, [. . .] no way of making people do what we say they should be doing and 
what they promise us. [. . .] We had a symposium with [. . .] senior leaders where we said: 
‘look let’s have a very honest conversation about [. . .] why we are not influencing 
change?’ [. . .] We all want the same thing which is fewer deaths and safer, fairer prisons 
but it’s just not happening [. . .] because it’s not a priority for them. [. . .] Nobody really 
has responsibility for the implementation of our recommendations, or those of other 
scrutiny bodies. [. . .] So we make recommendations [. . .], almost all [. . .] are accepted, 
[. . .] we get an action plan, detailing what the Prison Service [. . .] proposes to do to 
implement that recommendation but there it ends. We have no authority to make it 
happen, there are no consequences if it doesn’t happen and we have no way of following 
up to see whether it has happened, other than where we [. . .] investigate something else 
and we find the same failing.
Whilst these explanations are valid, such narratives divert attention from considering 
how the PPO could adjust its actions to attain control and make more of an impact on 
prison safety. Notably, none of the PPO staff considered the substance of their recommen-
dations. Although recommendations neither flow directly from investigations nor have 
a clear relationship with changes to policy and practice (Stark 2019), they are within the 
PPO’s control and have potential to achieve better organisational and policy learning 
(Hyland and Holme 2009).
Drawing on regulatory theory, this partnership has identified potential to: i) extend 
self-conscious, confident communication work, early in the investigation, across PPO 
investigators; ii) communicate praise as well as deficits throughout investigations; iii) 
adjust template recommendations. These findings have implications for prisoner death 
investigations and prison oversight bodies globally.
Regarding recommendations, Serious Case Review critiques highlight that there is 
rarely ‘a research evidence base cited for the recommendations’, begging the question of 
‘whether there were clear rationales for making, or not making, recommendations’ and 
‘the extent to which recommendations were thought to be likely to deliver change’ 
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(Brandon et al. 2012, p. 6). Moreover, the ‘type of recommendations which are easiest to 
[. . .] implement may not be the ones which are most likely to foster safer, reflective 
practice’ (Brandon et al. 2012, p. 6). Our next step involves designing a practical pilot to 
explore the potential of these three areas in PPO practice, including identifying good 
practice as well as systemic and individual failings throughout investigations. This could 
enhance the PPO’s capacity to effect change: leading to safer prisons, fewer preventable 
deaths and increased PPO staff wellbeing.
Discussion
Extant (inter)national prison oversight apparatuses are extensive, and being implemen-
ted in an increasing number of countries globally through OPCAT. Prison oversight 
holds substantive, yet unrealised potential to shape imprisonment, for the benefit of those 
who work and live in prisons, their families, and the societies from which prisoners come 
and almost always return. But, there is a surprisingly limited research base to inform 
prison oversight (Hardwick and Murray 2019, Rogan 2019). We need a great deal more 
research to understand the impact of and means of improving all forms of prison 
oversight: on prisons (Padfield 2018) and societies. Beyond individual expertise, there 
is no guidance available to direct or facilitate evidence-based recommendations, despite 
the ubiquity of recommendations as a prison oversight tool.
Nobody has yet developed an evidence base to guide how those recommendations 
should flow from investigation and inspection findings. This is a significant gap globally. 
OPCAT’s ratifying states must establish independent National Preventative Mechanisms 
(NPM) who regularly visit detention sites. NPM members are mandated to produce 
reports following their visits, which should, when appropriate ‘contain recommendations 
addressed to the relevant authorities’ (UN 2010, p. 3). Because the PPO is ‘wholly 
independent’ from the authorities in its remit, it is apparently equipped ‘to execute fair 
and impartial investigations, making recommendations for change where necessary, 
without fear or favour’ (PPO 2017, p. 1). Whilst independence is undeniably valuable, 
independence does not imply efficacy. Developing evidence-based, forward-facing 
recommendations for use by prison oversight bodies is an essential yet complicated 
task. The need for an evidence base for recommendations reflects a widespread issue in 
human rights practice: that ‘indicators’ of human rights progress are commonly for-
mulated without evidence that they have a causal relationship to the intended outcome, 
hence we have little knowledge of what forms of torture prevention actually work (Carver 
and Handley 2020).
Our partnership (Tomczak/McAllister) will soon pilot a revised fatal incident 
investigation report structure and revised recommendations, based on our research 
findings and drawing on lesson learning strategies, which have improved safety in the 
airline industry, healthcare and policing. Lesson learning is based on the idea that 
operational failure provides an invaluable learning opportunity, whether caused by 
mismanagement, misfortune, mistake, or misconduct. Lesson learning strategies 
involve investigators and analysts identifying all of the factors that contributed to 
failure, rather than presuming human error, and then implementing the lessons learned 
(Smith 2009).
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Notes
1. Domestic Homicide Review analysis identified that 40% of male perpetrators were suffering 
suicidal ideation. Proactively treating suicidal domestic abuse perpetrators could prevent 
many intimate partner homicides (Bridger et al. 2017).
2. https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/; https://www.judiciary.uk/subject/state- 
custody-related-deaths/.
3. The growing number of OPCAT ratifying jurisdictions must establish National Preventative 
Mechanisms to undertake regular detention visits (e.g. Cliquennois and Snacken 2018).
4. In public sector prisons.
5. In private sector prisons.
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